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State Inspection
Jeremy Waldron*
How should we think about the harm caused by hate speech? Does
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test provide an
appropriate framework for evaluating such harms? I think not, and I
would like to begin with an analogy.
A week ago, I received an email advising me that the required
annual New York State Inspection for my aged Subaru must take place
by July 31, 2020. The notice commanded me to take the car to a licensed
inspection station to have it checked for, among other things, a properly
functioning emissions-control system. This is a nuisance and it costs
money, even if the car passes the inspection. And if it does not pass,
modifications and repairs to the emissions system can be quite
expensive. Still, the test and the remedies for defects are required by
law. They are required because nothing but ensuring that all vehicles
have good working emissions systems can abate the danger posed by
the accumulation of pollutants from millions of individual vehicles.
New York State is obligated to require all this under the auspices of
the federal Clean Air Act.1 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which administers that legislation, says the following in one of its
pamphlets on emissions:
Emissions from an individual car are generally low, relative to
the smokestack image many people associate with air
pollution. But in numerous cities across the country, the
personal automobile is the single greatest polluter, as
emissions from millions of vehicles on the road add up.
Driving a private car is probably a typical citizen’s most
“polluting” daily activity.2

*University Professor, New York University School

of Law.
Emissions testing rules in New York are set out in Regulations of the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Part 79, Motor Vehicle Inspection), N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit.15, § 79 (2020), as authorized and required under section 301(d) of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301(d) (Consol. 2020). That is in turn
required under Title II of the federal Clean Air Act.
2 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (1994),
https://www.wisconsinvip.org/WivipPublic/PDF/Downloads/2_2_4.pdf.
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So here is my question: can I legitimately complain about the State
Inspection requirement because—as the EPA acknowledges—the level
of pollution caused by my car, or any individual car, is rather low even
if its emissions system is broken? In and of itself, the operation of my
Subaru poses no significant emissions hazard to anyone. There must be
thousands of such cars with non-working emissions systems before
there is discernable danger. So would I be justified in calling for the
repeal of the relevant statutes and regulations because of the
unwarranted burden they impose person-by-person on individual carowners?
We all know that such a response would be silly. As a society, we
collectively face dangers of air quality deterioration, carbon monoxide
poisoning, and lead toxicity, not to mention the greenhouse gas effects
of CO2. The fact that these dangers are not singularly caused by the
isolated acts of individuals considered on their own is not a reason to
refrain from abating them. There is no way to deal with these dangers
except by restrictions on drivers like me. The danger is real, each car
contributes, and emissions from large numbers of exhaust pipes add up.
Nothing but restrictions on thousands of cars like mine—requiring
testing and working emissions-control systems—offers any prospect of
averting the danger.
The temptation is to think that since regulation bears down upon
the behavior of individuals one-by-one, an individual should be
regulated only with respect to the harm caused specifically by his or her
actions. It is unjust, we might have said, to hold A liable for something
done by B. But if the similar actions of A and B and C (and thousands of
others) add up to a hazard, H, that impacts adversely on public health
generally, there may be no way of abating H except by regulating A’s
actions considered in light of B’s and C’s, and B’s actions considered in
light of A’s and C’s, and C’s actions considered in light of A’s and B’s, and
so on. An individualized focus on A’s actions alone, without reference to
the accumulation of its effects with the effects of the actions of B and C,
will leave H unabated and many people considerably worse off as a
result.
Even moral philosophers now understand this. The 1984
publication of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons marked a turning
point in consequentialist analysis.3 Parfit named Chapter Three “Five
Mistakes in Moral Mathematics.” Among the mistakes he diagnosed
were “[i]gnoring the [e]ffects of [s]ets of [a]ctions” and “[i]gnoring
[s]mall or [i]mperceptible [e]ffects.” As to the first, he wrote that “[i]t is
3

DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
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natural to assume . . . [that] [i]f some act is right or wrong because of its
effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act.”4
But he invited us to consider cases, familiar to theorists of criminal law
and tort law, where several people acting independently have an impact
on a single individual, resulting in an injury whose severity cannot be
attributed to any one of them alone.5 And as to the second, he posited a
case in which an individual is tortured by having the electric current on
an apparatus turned up gradually by imperceptible increments,
thousands of which cumulate into the infliction of agonizing pain.6 A
single torturer turns the increment switch again and again until the
victim is screaming in pain. Can the torturer defend himself against the
charge of torture by saying that nothing he did in any one of his actions
had a discernible effect upon the victim? Or put the two cases together:
Each of a thousand torturers turns his switch once to increase the
current by a tiny amount. If they understand the situation, are they not
all of them complicit in a set of actions that has dire consequences? Or
can they take refuge in absence of any direct and clear causal line
extending from what each does individually to what the victim
eventually suffers?
Parfit’s hypotheticals are curious in their
7
substance, but the moral is clear: When we consider the consequential
significance of what we do, we must take into account the actions of
many individuals. The consequences of these collective actions can
result in a harm, the magnitude and importance of which is belied by
focusing on each person’s behavior, considered under the auspices of
older and cruder models of causation.
In the pollution cases, the accumulation of overall harm takes place
over more than one dimension. The effects that H comprises may be an
accumulation across thousands of individual actions occurring
simultaneously. Toxins in the air breathed by children in an urban
playground may be the result of thousands of vehicles operating in the
vicinity on a given morning. Or H may build up slowly over time: the
toxins present in a town’s water supply may be the result of years of
pollution—again at a level that is barely perceptible considered as an
individual effect—by vehicles driving at or near that town. Once the
responsible authorities become aware of the danger and its causes, they
can intervene with regulation and controls to make it less likely that the
4

Id. at 70, 75.
See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (establishing doctrine of alternative
liability).
6 See PARFIT, supra note 3, at 80–82.
7 For doubts about some of Parfit’s hypotheticals, see Kristin Shrader-Frechette,
Parfit and Mistakes in Moral Mathematics, 98 ETHICS 50 (1987).
5
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harm will accrue. Such regulation prevents the accumulation of the
large number of tiny indiscernible effects that would otherwise grow
together to constitute a deadly environmental effect.
This strategy, however, is possible only if the authorities refuse to
limit their justifying restrictions to imminent and directly traceable
harm, in other words, harm that accrues immediately from each
individual’s actions. As Cass Sunstein points out, “regulators often act
without the slightest hesitation even though the benefits of their action
will not be immediate; indeed, such benefits might occur many years in
the future (as in the case of climate change).”8 They have to do so
because waiting until the harm was imminent would make abatement
impossible.
Maybe Sunstein is too optimistic about regulators’ attitudes to
harms of this kind. Many environmentalists are far from convinced that
the politics of regulation can deal with what they call “slow threats,” i.e.,
situations “where small, hardly noticeable changes add up over time to
produce large impacts.” 9 The time scale may be decades or generations.
It is not easy to factor the pacing of such threats into the frameworks of
modern politics. Their accrual involves “time periods that historians
regularly deal with, but that stretch out beyond the time frame in which
governments make budgets or do strategic planning.”10 Such threats
may be mentioned occasionally in newscasts or op-eds when
a major research report is published or some disaster occurs,
but they seldom reach the level of sustained visibility and
concern they deserve. Without that awareness and sense of
alarm, the problems are likely to continue worsening until
their impacts become severe and obvious, stressing our ability
to respond, or, in the worst cases, passing tipping points
where no amount of effort can prevent catastrophic impacts.11
*
The “Slow Threats” literature shows that progress in regulatory
approach is still patchy. It seems to be particularly problematic in
regulating social harm—especially pervasive social harm that accrues
from the accumulation of large numbers of relatively small-scale
phenomena, such as individual speech acts, interactions, and
aggressions.

8 Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Clear and Present Danger Test Survive Cost-Benefit
Analysis?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1775, 1777 (2019).
9 Robert L. Olson & David Rejeski, Slow Threats and Environmental Policy, 48 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10116, 10116–17 (2018).
10 Id. at 10117.
11 Id. at 10116–17.
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One area where accumulating harm has been taken seriously
concerns the accumulation of small-scale but visible damage to
buildings and vehicles and its effects on the overall morale of urban
neighborhoods. The “broken windows” theory was put forward by
George Kelling and James Q. Wilson in a 1982 article,12 in which they
argued that visible signs on the streets of lack of repair—things like a
broken window, a pile of uncollected garbage, damaged furniture, or an
abandoned car—were likely to attract further disorder and crime
because they signified to anyone interested that social controls were
weak or attenuated at that locale.13 No single item would lead to this
effect, but an accumulation, even a slow accumulation of such damage
over time, would transform the atmosphere on that block or in that
neighborhood.
Now some commentators have made a direct connection between
the broken windows theory and the damage wrought by hate speech.
Gregory Rodriguez says that “[h]ate speech is a form of vandalism. It
defaces the environment, and like a broken window, if left untended,
signals to other hoodlums that the coast is clear to do more damage.”14
Maybe this is how some of the harm from hate speech comes about. And
sometimes it may be intentional. Frank Collin, the leader of the Nazis
who marched through Skokie in a famous incident from the 1970s said:
“We want to reach the good people—get the fierce anti-Semites who
have to live among the Jews to come out of the woodwork and stand up
for themselves.”15 The idea was that timid anti-Semites would feel safer
expressing themselves publicly in a social atmosphere already
vandalized by Collin’s neo-Nazi followers parading with foul and
provocative signs (“Hitler should have finished the job,” etc.). But there
are also broader modes of the accumulation of social harm that are more
akin to the slow-acting poison hypothesis that regulators use in
understanding environmental threats.
As I have indicated, developing an appropriate regulatory response
to the harm done by hate speech is made difficult by the iconic status of
the “clear and present danger” test in First Amendment law and politics.
I suspect the currency of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s formulation indicates
that some of us are still in the grip of primitive thinking in some of what
12 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/30
4465/.
13 This language is adapted from my article, Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and
Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 371, 386 (2000).
14 Gregory Rodriguez, Vandalized by Speech, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at A13.
15 PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE 15 (1999); see JEREMY WALDRON,
HARM IN HATE SPEECH 95 (2012).
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we say about hate speech and the harm it causes. According to Holmes,
it is permissible to “punish speech that produces . . . a clear and
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive
evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. . . . It is
only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about
that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion
. . . .”16 The reiteration of these requirements of fast-approaching
danger—”clear and imminent,” danger “that it will bring about
forthwith,” “the present danger of immediate evil”—raises doubts about
the serviceability of Holmes’s doctrine in addressing slow threats and
the accumulation of harm. As I said in my book The Harm in Hate Speech,
Imagine if we took that attitude toward environmental
harms—toward automobile emissions, for example. Suppose
we said that unless someone can show that my automobile
causes lead poisoning with direct detriment and imminent
harm to the health of assignable individuals, I shouldn’t be
required to fit an emission-control device to my car’s exhaust
pipe. It would be irresponsible to reason in that way with
regard to environmental regulation; instead we figure that the
tiny impacts of millions of actions—each apparently
inconsiderable in itself—can produce a large-scale toxic effect
that, even at the mass level, operates insidiously as a sort of
slow-acting poison, and that regulations have to be aimed at
individual actions with that scale and that pace of causation in
mind.17
Why then is it sensible to take that approach—looking only to
macro-harms and their immediate causation—when we are considering
social harm? As Leslie Kendrick observes, “[t]he clear and present
danger standard limits itself to acute situations, where particular
expression is highly likely to have an immediate, demonstrable
impact.”18 It would not cover “speech that erodes democratic ideals
gradually—speech that promotes anti-Semitism and racial hatred,” for
example.19
“Repeated, corrosive exposure causes harm by
16 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
actual phrase “clear and present danger” came not from Abrams but from the slightly
later case of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). “The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree.” Id.
17 WALDRON, supra note 15 at 97 (emphasis in original).
18 Leslie Kendrick, On “Clear and Present Danger”, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653,
1665–66 (2019).
19 Id. at 1666.
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accumulation,” says Kendrick, but “[a] literal reading of Holmes’s . . .
opinions would suggest that such harms are not the type of emergency
that justifies suppression.”20
How does all this apply to hate speech? Doctrinally, Kendrick’s
difficulty with the clear and present danger test is difficult to see
because those who favor restricting hate speech sometimes argue as
though such speech is per se valueless. On that argument, the “clear and
present danger” test would not apply at all, since hate speech would be
in the same category as obscenity or constitutionally unprotected
defamation.21 And indeed the Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois
suggested that hate speech might be put in this category by being
considered as group defamation.22 This certainly provides an
alternative to the clear and present danger test, but the alternative does
not require us to vary our mode of consequential analysis to include
non-imminent threats. In fact, defenders of hate speech regulation have
sometimes been willing to pursue both lines of argument. Thus, on the
one hand, the racist pamphlet at issue in Beauharnais was classified as
a group libel. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter was also willing to
approach the issue of consequential harm by making a powerful
argument about social atmospherics—the danger of “exacerbat[ing]
tension between races.”23
Illinois did not have to . . . await the tragic experience of the
last three decades to conclude that wilful purveyors of
falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote
strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold
adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan,
polyglot community.24
The either/or here was not valueless speech versus a showing of clear
and present danger; it was valueless speech versus a showing of harm,
which might include either clear and present danger or slow-acting
harm to the social environment.

20

Id. at 1667.
See Tom Hentoff, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of
the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1462–63 (1991).
22 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances not
being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for
us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear and present
danger.’ Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be
punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel . . . is in the same class.”).
23 Id. at 259.
24 Id. at 258–59.
21
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This consequential analysis is certainly what the best-drafted hate
speech statutes around the world seem to be looking to capture. The
United Kingdom’s Public Order Act looks at the speaker’s intention “to
stir up racial hatred.”25 The German Penal Code and the Canadian Penal
Code are concerned with the incitement of hatred, the New Zealand
Human Rights Act punishes words “likely to excite hostility,” and so on.26
All of these measures seem to be concerned with the effect of hate
speech in poisoning the atmosphere in which diverse groups are
expected to live together.
I suppose one could parse such statutes in a spirit of strict
individualism: one could interpret them as prohibiting one person, X,
from stirring up hatred in the mind of another person, Y, against a third
person, Z. But the hatred that the legislators are concerned about seems
to diffuse community-wide hatred against members of a large (albeit
minority) group defined by race, religion, or national origin rather than
hatred focused on particular individuals. The hatred itself is mentioned
as something abstract, spread directly and indirectly among members
of the audience to whom the message of hate is delivered. And it makes
sense to understand the offense as a person doing something—in
circumstances in which others are likely to be doing it too—so that what
25 Public Order Act 1986, c. 64, § 18 (1) (Eng.) (“A person who uses threatening,
abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is
threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if—(a) he intends thereby to stir
up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be
stirred up thereby.”) (emphasis added).
26 STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130(1), translation at, https://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.) (“Whosoever, in a manner that
is capable of disturbing the public peace 1. incites hatred against segments of the
population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 2. assaults the
human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming segments of
the population, shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years.”
(emphasis added)); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 319(1) (Can.) (“Everyone who,
by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable
group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years”
(emphasis added)); Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(1) (N.Z.) (“It shall be unlawful for any
person—(a) to publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or
insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or other electronic communication words
which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or (b) to use in any public place . . . or at any
meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are threatening,
abusive, or insulting; or (c) to use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or
insulting if the person using the words knew or ought to have known that the words
were reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or periodical or
broadcast by means of radio or television,—being matter or words likely to excite
hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to
New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group
of persons” (emphasis added)).
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has to be considered from the legislators’ point of view is the effect of
this one incident of hate speech alongside lots of other such incidents in
society at large. Of course, one act of individual hate speech may fizzle
out without any larger social effect, like one of the ratty little pamphlets
that Holmes alluded to in Abrams.27 But before we can dismiss it in that
way, we must be sure that its apparent harmlessness is not an illusion
born of the assumption that long-term social degradation does not
matter.
The long-term threat envisaged in this legislation is the stirring up
and spreading of hatred and contempt, of hostility against and between
various groups in society. In any diverse society, inter-communal
hostility and the undermining of social peace is one of the things most
to be dreaded. Once it comes into existence, it is very hard to roll back.
One need only think of Hindu-Muslim antipathy in India, for example,
or, for much of the twentieth century, hatred between Nationalist
(Catholic) and Loyalist (Protestant) communities in Northern Ireland.
Or consider the effects of immigration. The New Zealand provision
mentioned earlier makes an explicit connection to the social tensions
that might arise out of an influx of immigrants; it talks of “words likely
to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons
in or who may be coming to New Zealand.”28 The authorities have to pay
attention to such possibilities. Those responsible for the well-being of a
society cannot view this with indifference or, given the mode of its
causation, postpone dealing with it until the onset of its worst effects is
imminent.
One can also look at the issue of social atmospherics in a more
positive light. Think of Justice Frankfurter’s modest formulation in
Beauharnais: “the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life
in a metropolitan, polyglot community.”29 These adjustments define for
us the deep ecology of respect, tolerance, and inclusion in our society.
We are diverse in our ethnicities, our race, and our religion. And we are
embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together within
and despite these differences. Each group must accept that society is
not just for them, but it is for them too, along with all the others. And
each person, each member of each group, should be able to go about his
or her business with the assurance that there will be no need to face
hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion by others. When this
assurance is conveyed effectively, it is hardly noticeable; it is something
on which everyone can rely, we hope, like relying on the cleanness of the
27
28
29

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(1) (N.Z.) (emphasis added).
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 259 (1952).
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air they breathe or the quality of the water they drink from a fountain.
This sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good, and in
a decent society, it is something that we all contribute to and help
sustain in an instinctive and almost unnoticeable way. Hate speech
undermines this public good, or it makes the task of sustaining it much
more difficult than it would otherwise be.30
This is best stated by Bhikhu Parekh, a British political theorist and
member of the House of Lords:
Hate speech . . . lowers the tone of public debate, coarsens the
society’s moral sensibility, and weakens the culture of mutual
respect that lies at the heart of a good society. . . . It creates
barriers of mistrust and hostility between individuals and
groups, plants fears, obstructs normal relations between
them, and in general exercises a corrosive influence on the
conduct of collective life.31
Ultimately the impact is on individuals, as public expressions of hatred
change the character of the environment in which they must live and
work. In R. v. Keegstra (1990), the Canadian Chief Justice Brian Dickson
said this about the effect that public expressions of hatred may have on
people’s lives:
The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate
propaganda . . . have a severely negative impact on the
individual’s sense of self-worth and acceptance. This impact
may cause target group members to take drastic measures in
reaction, perhaps avoiding activities which bring them into
contact with non-group members or adopting attitudes and
postures directed towards blending in with the majority. Such
consequences bear heavily in a nation that prides itself on
tolerance and the fostering of human dignity through, among
other things, respect for the many racial, religious and cultural
groups in our society.32
A hateful atmosphere stigmatizes members of vulnerable groups,
contributing, as Parekh puts it, to “a climate in which, over time, some
groups come to be demonized and their discriminatory treatment is
accepted as normal.”33 Parekh points out the obtuseness of working
with a Holmesian standard in this area. “[H]arm,” he says,
is not easy to define, identify and prove. A relentless decline in
the society’s climate of mutual respect is a case of serious
harm, but it does not point to specific individuals. . . .[.[A]n
30
31
32
33

This paragraph is adapted from WALDRON, supra note 15, at 4.
Bhikhu Parekh, Limits of Free Speech, 45 PHILOSOPHIA 931, 932 (2017).
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R 697 (Can.).
Parekh, supra note 31, at 933.
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isolated case of hate speech can be taken in one’s stride. But
over time such remark [sic] create a climate that might be
deeply offensive and unacceptable. 34
“Vicious and widespread hatred of a group does not spring up
overnight.”35 This is clearly danger, but it is not “present” danger in
Holmes’s sense. Like any of the slow threats we described earlier, it
“builds up slowly, through isolated utterances and actions, each perhaps
trivial individually but all cumulatively capable of coarsening the
community’s sensibility.”36
I think this is what we ought to be addressing in our thinking about
hate speech. It is true that in Abrams v. United States, Holmes gave voice
to a rightly celebrated dissent. But he did not leave us with the doctrines
we needed in order to think sensibly about this kind of harm generated
in this kind of way.
*
I want to end with some thoughts about the acceptance or lack of
acceptance of this kind of argument. In debates about hate speech—at
least in the United States—whenever I make a case for paying attention
to slow-building atmospheric harm of the sort described here, I am
confronted with immediate skepticism. Audiences flatly insist that we
must stick with something like the “clear and present danger” approach
and they will barely countenance any other approach to the causation of
harm. And so, I wonder, what explains this insistent reliance on
Holmes’s standard when its use would make little sense in other areas
of regulation? Why this blind loyalty to what seems like a crude and
outdated understanding of the way harm accrues and the way it may be
regulated?
The sense I get is that people fear some trick; they suspect this is
not real causation at all, just something that progressives say to one
another to justify restrictions on liberty. For—they say—it cannot
possibly be the case that hate speech causes harm in this sort of way. Or
if it does, the harm in question need not be taken seriously since it is not
an outbreak of fighting or anything like that.
Occasionally one hears an acknowledgment that harm of this kind
does exist, but the acknowledgment is coupled quickly with a refusal to
be moved by it: hate speech is said to be protected constitutionally “not
because we doubt the speech inflicts harm, but because we fear the

34
35
36

Id. at 934–35.
Id. at 933.
Id.
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censorship more.”37 This at least is candid, compared with the usual line
of magical thinking: because speech is constitutionally protected, it
simply cannot be the case that hate speech causes harm in this way.
The latter is an outcome-driven argument. And one hears a lot of it
in these debates about free speech. It is said, for example, that
degradation of the social environment of the sort that I have been
talking about must not be counted as harm. To regard it as harm would
be implicitly to undermine the status of free speech as a constitutional
right. So, conversely, a full-blooded commitment to free speech as a
constitutional right has to mean setting one’s face against this sort of
harm. I have found this a common response to my identification of a
dignitarian dimension to the harm wrought by hate speech. It is said
that the recognition of dignity as a legitimate interest is a sort of Trojan
horse,38 or (to vary the metaphor) it sets us on a slippery slope toward
a European-style understanding of rights. Recognizing that dignity is at
stake means admitting considerations of proportionality and balance
into the rights equation. Such considerations, it is thought, undermine
the distinctively principled character of American constitutional
rights.39 So, as good Americans, we must blind ourselves to the effect of
hate speech on human dignity: that’s the upshot of the first line of
argument.
Or it is said that the model of causation I am using is inherently
opposed to free speech as a constitutional right. No one who believes in
free speech will be willing to accept that harm can accrue in the way that
I have been suggesting. It is a mark of one’s allegiance to the principle
of free speech that one repudiates such a model of causation. This too is
outcome-driven; we don’t like the argument’s outcome, so we infer that
there must be something wrong with the structure of its causal analysis.
I think this sort of outcome-driven rejection of the slow-threat
model of causation is unfortunate. Apart from anything else, discussions
of it in the free speech arena almost invariably ignore the widely
accepted use of such models elsewhere in public regulation. Professor
Blasi’s fine essay in this volume on the Holmesian response to claims
about remote harm makes no mention whatsoever of the emissions or

37 Michael W. McConnell, You Can’t Say That, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/books/review/the-harm-in-hate-speech-byjeremy-waldron.html.
38 Guy Carmi, Dignity—The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative
Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 958
(2007).
39 See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 201 (2008).
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other environmental examples.40 It treats remote causation in the
context of speech as though it were sui generis and as though the model
of causation could be evaluated without reference to its use in any other
domain or (to put it perhaps unfairly) as though these matters could be
discussed without venturing beyond the confines of regulatory theory
circa 1919.
And anyway, there is no reason for free speech advocates to be
opposed in principle to this sort of causal model. On the contrary,
something like it—the long-term and cumulative effect of lots of smallscale interactions—is often invoked in defense of free speech. Holmes’s
“free trade in ideas” conception—”the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”41—
relies on it. That conception invites us to consider speech acts not in and
of themselves individually, but in a vast number of market-like
interactions with hundreds of other speech acts, building upon and
responding to one another, filtering out falsehoods and dead ends.
Truth, if it emerges here, is a benefit but not a clear and present one; it
is the result of complex sifting and accumulation.
Something similar is also involved on the negative side when
thinkers like John Stuart Mill and his modern followers worry about the
accumulation of conformist tendencies into “so great a mass of
influences hostile to Individuality.”42 We hear an echo of it too in a
recent open letter published in Harper’s Magazine about the impact of
“cancel culture”:
Editors are fired for running controversial pieces; books are
withdrawn for alleged inauthenticity; journalists are barred
from writing on certain topics; professors are investigated for
quoting works of literature in class; a researcher is fired for
circulating a peer-reviewed academic study; and the heads of
organizations are ousted for what are sometimes just clumsy
mistakes. Whatever the arguments around each particular
incident, the result has been to steadily narrow the
boundaries of what can be said without the threat of
reprisal. . . .This stifling atmosphere will ultimately harm the
most vital causes of our time.43
Each of the incidents alluded to might seem like an outrage to the
freedom of those affected. But the letter is mostly concerned with the
overall tendency of hundreds of such instances and the resultant
40

See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 132 (2nd ed. 1859).
43 A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, July 7, 2020,
https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/.
41
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atmosphere. It ill behooves anyone who deploys the model of
atmospheric accumulation in this way to denounce it as such when it is
used by their opponents. I don’t mean this as a simple tu quoque. One
person might use the cumulation of small effects to make a case in favor
of restrictions on speech, and one may also use the cumulation of other
small effects to make a case against such restrictions. The fact that it is
used on one side does not mean that exception cannot be taken to (e.g.
the empirics of) its use on the other side. My point is simply that
arguments of this kind should not be ruled out, out of hand.
All that said, it is important to acknowledge that these claims about
atmospheric harms are not self-verifying. The power of the analogy
with auto emissions that I began with doesn’t make them true. Maybe
the empirical evidence that hate speech leads to a slow accrual of harm
is less convincing than it is in the auto emissions analogy. Jacob
Mchangama, for example, says that “[w]hile we know for certain that the
cumulative effect of automobile exhaust causes harmful pollution that
can be averted with emission controls, we cannot with any degree of
certainty know that the cumulative effect of hate speech results in
‘environmental’ harm avoidable by restricting free speech.”44
It’s a fair point. In other contexts, we might be quite skeptical of
such claims about the accrual of harm. Suppose someone were to use
the environmental analogy to justify prosecutions for sedition. (That,
after all, was the real issue in the Abrams case.) Would defenders of
restrictions on hate speech be willing to countenance defenses of the
regulation of sedition—the prosecution of apparent trivialities like Mr.
Abrams’s “silly leaflet”45—on the ground that hundreds of such
publications might add up over time to a genuine threat to national
security? We must be sure that in our enthusiasm for considering this
form of causation we do not give carte blanche to every alleged instance
of the form.
Also, it is important to acknowledge that arguments for restricting
hate speech based on slow causation are inherently vulnerable to the
objection that more speech can always be inserted into the public debate
to obviate long-term atmospheric threats. “If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not

44 Jacob Mchangama, The Harm in Hate Speech Laws, HOOVER INST. POL’Y REV. (Dec.
2012), https://www.hoover.org/research/harm-hate-speech-laws (reviewing
WALDRON, supra note 15).
45 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.
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enforced silence.”46 There is nothing in the mode of causation that I have
been considering that rules out the possibility that countervailing
speech might make such a difference. And there is nothing equivalent
in the emissions analogy.
On the other hand, how we think about harm makes a difference in
the way we treat the point about countervailing speech. The point about
countervailing speech might easily be exaggerated, especially in a
context where the hate speech in question is supposed to wreak its
damage atmospherically rather than persuasively.47 Defenders of free
speech want the countervailing speech hypothesis to be true. But its
common treatment as just something effective to say when concerns are
voiced about the slow accumulation of harm hardly indicates that the
prospect of that accumulation is being taken seriously.

46 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring with
Holmes, J.).
47 See also Note, Clear and Present Danger Re-Examined, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 106
(1951) (“[I]ndividuals vary in their degree of openmindedness. It would therefore seem
that decisive significance can hardly be attached to the mere opportunity for free
discussion, since the consequences of such an opportunity are variant and relatively
unpredictable.”).

